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“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” These first words of the
First Amendment would seem to designate religion as a special category
in constitutional law. While acknowledging this textual designation,
however, some legal scholars have come to view the category as a product
of historical contingencies of the late eighteenth-century; they have
doubted whether persuasive contemporary justifications are available for
giving special constitutional treatment to religion. (Or at least special
favorable treatment: scholars have tended to be more approving of special
constitutional burdens or disabilities imposed on religion under the
Establishment Clause.)1
So, is there any good justification today for giving special constitutional
treatment to religion? In March 2014 a select group of legal scholars
gathered at the University of San Diego to discuss the question: “Is Religion
Outdated (as a Constitutional Category)?” This Symposium collects
some of the papers that were presented and discussed at that conference.
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1. For discussion of these developments, see STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 139–66 (2014).
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I. ACCOMMODATING RELIGION?
Perhaps the most direct manifestation of the question is posed by the
practice of presumptively exempting religious objectors from complying
with laws that burden their exercise of religion. For decades, constitutional
doctrine purported to command such accommodation;2 although that
doctrine was revised in the well-known Peyote case, 3 presumptive
accommodation is still required under statutes such as the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, applied last term in the controversial Hobby
Lobby decision.4 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s much discussed decision
two terms ago in the Hosanna-Tabor case 5 indicated that religious
institutions may still enjoy a constitutional right to be exempted from
some statutes.
Several of the papers in this Symposium develop a skeptical position
with respect to religious accommodation. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan
articulates two main objections.6 First, she doubts that the term “religion”
describes any manageable or coherent category of human activities. The
difficulty has often been noted, but Sullivan thinks the problem has become
even more intractable “given the compromised genealogy of the term
and the wildly diverse social and cultural objects that have been and might
be termed religious.”7 Second, she argues (as do other contributors to the
Symposium) that exemption of actors deemed “religious” from general
legal obligations violates constitutional commitments to equality. Sullivan
directs especially sharp criticism against the claim that institutional religious
actors, or “the church,” are deserving of special constitutional solicitude.
Some of these objections are reiterated in the article by Maimon
Schwarzschild. But Schwarzschild primarily articulates a different
concern—that exempting religious believers and institutions will aggravate
the political fragmentation or “balkanization” that he perceives in the
contemporary world. 8 Schwarzschild also explains how legal
accommodation can encourage more extreme or fanatical actors to
achieve domination of religious groups. “Extensive religious autonomy,
in short, can lead to the creation—with state approval—of islands of
2. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972).
3. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
4. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
5. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Schoolv. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012).
6. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Why Distinguish Religion, Legally Speaking?, 51
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1101 (2014).
7. Id. at 1101.
8. Maimon Schwarzschild, How Much Autonomy Do You Want?, 51 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1085, 1091 (2014).
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authoritarianism in an otherwise free and democratic society.”9
Schwarzschild concludes by suggesting that religious individuals and
institutions would be well advised to focus on limiting governmental
power rather than on gaining legal exemptions.
In an unusually personal essay,10 Frederick Mark Gedicks challenges
one occasionally expressed rationale for giving special treatment to
religion—that religion provides humans with “meaning.” Reflecting on a
family tragedy, Gedicks suggests that religion is not the exclusive or
most important source of “meaning” in life.
In contrast to these articles, Christopher Eberle makes a case for special
treatment of religion.11 Eberle’s contribution is primarily a careful, critical
assessment of a widely discussed book opposing special treatment of
religion—Brian Leiter’s Why Tolerate Religion? Toward the end of his
essay, however, and growing out of his criticisms of Leiter, Eberle sketches
both a secular and a religious or “Augustinian” rationale for accommodating
religion. Contrary to a common assumption, Eberle suggests that both
the secular and the religious rationales should count in public deliberations:
if civility and mutual respect entail that religious citizens should offer
reasons that address their secular neighbors, it equally follows that secular
citizens should offer reasons that speak to their devout fellow citizens.
II. RELIGION AND/OR CONSCIENCE?
In a wide-ranging exploration, William Galston contends that religion
is not like other mundane interests and that, for believers, religion is
more than a matter of mere “flourishing.”
There are . . . two features of religion that figure centrally in the debate about
religiously-based exemptions from otherwise valid laws. First, believers
understand the requirements of religious beliefs and actions as central rather
than peripheral to their identity; and second, they experience these requirements
as authoritative commands. Regardless of whether an individual experiences
religious requirements as promoting or rather thwarting self-development, their
power is compelling.12

9. Id. at 1098.
10. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Religion, Meaning, Truth, Life, 51 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1069 (2014).
11. Christopher J. Eberle, Religion and Insularity: Brian Leiter on Accommodating
Religion, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 977 (2014).
12. William Galston, Religion, Conscience, and the Case for Accommodation, 51
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1045, 1059 (2014).
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This linkage of personal identity to dual authorities provides a rationale,
Galston argues, for giving special constitutional protection to religion.
However, these two features are not unique to religious believers; some
secular citizens experience a similar conflict of duties or authorities.
Thus, Galston applauds the Supreme Court’s well known decisions from
the Vietnam War period13 exempting conscientious but not conventionally
religious objectors from serving in the military.14
In this respect, Galston arrives at a position that other jurists and
scholars have favored: constitutional protection should be extended not
to religion per se, or at least not only to religion, but rather to conscience,
with religion benefitting as a sort of (sometimes) lesser included subcategory. In this Symposium, this position is debated by Micah Schwartzman
and Andrew Koppelman. In earlier writings, Schwartzman had suggested
that religion should not be deemed constitutionally special, but that special
protection might permissibly be given to conscience.15 In his essay in
this volume, Koppelman criticizes this position,16 arguing that religion
holds a special place in the American constitutional tradition and that this
position is justifiable because religion is a good proxy for a range of
important values. Conscience is one of those values—but hardly the only
one.
Schwartzman responds17 by acknowledging that “religion” and
“conscience” are overlapping but not coextensive categories. Some
human interests fall under the head of religion but not of conscience; others
belong to conscience but not to religion. It follows that accommodating
only religion will leave some claims of conscience unprotected. Such
treatment is unfair, Schwartzman argues, violating constitutional
commitments to equality. This unfairness can be avoided, he maintains,
by legally accommodating both religion and conscience.

13. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); Seeger v. United States, 380
U.S. 163 (1965).
14. Commenting on Galston, Larry Alexander identifies a number of questions
that Galston’s article raises. In particular, Alexander focuses on the problem of justifying
“toleration of error,” and he suggests but does not endorse several possible responses to
that problem. Larry Alexander, Galston on Religion, Conscience, and the Case for
Accommodation, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1065 (2014).
15. See, e.g., Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1351 (2012).
16. Andrew Koppelman, “Religion” as a Bundle of Legal Proxies: Reply to Micah
Schwartzman, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1079 (2014).
17. Micah Schwartzman, Religion as a Legal Proxy, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1085
(2014).
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III. QUESTIONING THE QUESTION
Commenting explicitly on Schwartzman but implicitly on the other
authors as well, Stanley Fish suggests that scholars and jurists are asking
whether “religion” is “special” by reference to some nonreligious value
or framework. But to frame the question in this way is already to miss
the essential point—that religion is special precisely because it refuses to
be subordinated to any supposedly more primary or encompassing value
or framework. Rather, religion holds itself out as a totalizing, encompassing
ontological and normative framework. Nothing else is comparable.
To put the point as baldly as possible, there is not, and could not be, any parallel
between religious beliefs and the beliefs that make up what Schwartzman calls
the “secular claims of conscience.” As propositions about the world and your
relation to it, they are entirely different animals. The assertion that they are
“comparable” or “functionally equivalent” can only be made to work if what is
distinctive, that is, special, about religion . . . is regarded as a quaint but now
annoying relic of an age of superstition, while the true essence of religion is
identified with whatever in its teachings can be squared with liberal rationalism.
Then you can say that religion is not special because the specimen laid out on
your dissecting table has had the heart cut out of it.18

Conversely, if we attend to what religion really is, or claims to be, we
arrive at a different conclusion.
Being special is the business religion is in. And as it so happens it is a business
recognized by the Constitution. So specialness is validated all around. End of
story, end of argument. Not, however, the end of the political problem, which is
what to do with a discourse marked as special by the Constitution, as well as by
its own claims, in a society where the value of obedience to a revered authority
is held in slight regard and has been replaced by the values of equal treatment,
fairness and human flourishing—Or so it would seem if you spend most of your
19
life in elite law schools.

IV. CONCLUSION
Whether religion is or should be constitutionally special is a question
that has been with us for a good long time, and it promises to provoke
debate for a long time yet. The diverse perspectives articulated in this
Symposium represent a valuable contribution to that debate.

18.
19.

Stanley Fish, Where’s the Beef?, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1037, 1042 (2014).
Id.
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